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Hartwig, D. Scott To Antietam Creek: The Maryland Campaign of September
1862. Johns Hopkins University Press, $49.95 ISBN 978-1-4214-0631-2
A New Look at a Pivotal Campaign
Stephen Sears, Richard Slotkin, Joseph Harsh, and Civil War veteran Ezra
Carman are just a few of the historians who have committed pen and paper to
recount the 1862 Antietam campaign. Given the quality of their books and so
many others, do Civil War enthusiasts really need another accounting of Lee’s
first invasion of the North? In the case of D. Scott Hartwig’s To Antietam Creek,
yes, room should be made on the bookshelf. While historians frequently overuse
“definitive" and “comprehensive" as descriptors in book reviews, such terms are
appropriate in this case. In 652 pages of text, plus more than one hundred pages
of appendices and notes, Hartwig recounts the campaign from the conclusion of
Second Bull Run to the eve of Antietam’s bloodletting. To be clear, this weighty
volume concludes on the night of September 16, 1862, with the opposing armies
tensed for the morrow’s fight. Readers anticipating the telling of the Civil War’s
bloodiest day must await volume two.
Although Hartwig offers no new revelations, he crafts this history in grand
style, arguing that if the campaign and its culminating battle were not the turning
point of the war, both sides recognized afterward that there would be “no turning
back" (2). Equally in command of the primary and secondary sources, his
narrative is meticulously detailed and stunningly vivid. The Battle of Fox’s Gap,
for example, consumes two chapters of nearly seventy-five pages, with each
strike and counter-strike recounted with color and clarity. The fight at Turner’s
Gap is also played out over two chapters, Crampton’s Gap over one. In another
passage, the Confederates’ occupation of Fredrick, Maryland, comes to life with
all the sights, sounds, and smells of Robert E. Lee’s ragged Rebels and their
encounters with the town’s wary, suspicious civilians. Clear, well-placed maps
and a scattering of illustrations further complements the compelling narrative.
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More than eloquent storytelling, To Antietam Creek also offers sound
analysis of events and commanders. Hartwig holds both George McClellan and
Lee to account for their errors, and equally credits their successes. McClellan’s
well-known leadership short-comings, insecurities, and paranoia are made
inescapably evident with Hartwig’s relentless but fair critiques. Close analysis of
McClellan’s tactical skills exposes his command deficiencies, exemplified by his
plans on the eve of September 17, in which the general failed to consider some
fundamental principles of war, including surprise, mass, and maneuver.
Nevertheless, Hartwig offers praise when warranted, as in his acknowledgement
of McClellan’s success in resurrecting a disorganized, demoralized Army of the
Potomac after the Second Bull Run debacle. In addition, the general’s strategic
thinking, after the discovery of Confederate Special Orders No. 191, which
outlined the whereabouts and anticipated movements of Lee’s scattered forces,
was sound, characterized by initiative, mass, flexibility, simplicity, and the
offensive. But as Omar Bradley once observed, a successful operation is ten
percent planning and ninety percent execution. In the end, McClellan failed
because he could not see clearly a path forward, and thus succumbed to
circumstances rather than seizing the initiative to force his will upon events.
Seizing and maintaining momentum was second nature for Robert E. Lee,
and while the challenges of the Maryland campaign were a trial for one of the
war’s best commanders, he again showed a mastery of shaping events. As the
campaign was just getting under way, Lee discussed possible options with his
two corps commanders, Stonewall Jackson and James Longstreet. Both
recommended first confronting the pursuing Union forces, then making a strike
at the Federal garrisons of Harpers Ferry and Martinsburg, Virginia. Lee,
however, thought otherwise; take the outposts first, then with a secure line of
communication, turn to face down McClellan. Lee’s plan won over Jackson, but
the idea of dividing the army into four parts was anathema to the more
conservative Longstreet. Even after realizing that McClellan held a copy of
Special Orders No. 191, Lee’s audacity persisted beyond strategic sensibility as
he labored to hold the initiative--if not Longstreet’s full support. Lee’s tactical
prowess, however, remained exemplary, as Hartwig makes evident in his
assessment of the general’s careful management of troop dispositions on the eve
of battle, his consideration of possible contingencies, and his determination to
never relinquish the upper hand. That being said, Hartwig convincingly asserts
that Lee’s decision to make a stand at Sharpsburg “was building sand castles"
(519).
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To Antietam Creek is no book for the Civil War beginner. Any number of
brief accounts serve that purpose. Hartwig’s mastery of events and personalities,
his vigorous writing, and the book’s imposing length will be most appreciated by
historians and those already familiar with the campaign’s highlights. It is
difficult to imagine that a future study on this campaign could supersede
Hartwig’s work, but until the completion of volume two on the battle itself, the
story remains but half told.
Harry S. Laver, professor of history at Southeastern Louisiana University, is
the author of: A General Who Will Fight: The Leadership of Ulysses S. Grant.
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